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PUBLIC INSUPANC~, PPIVA!E INSURANCE, AND ThE DEMAND FOB HOSPITAL CABE: 
IfPLICATIGNS fO& MiDICAEE AND PRIVATE CONTRACTS 
Martin. Zelder 
February 21, 1983 
Oberlin College 
In 1971, Elliot Richardson, then Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, lamented the state of the American 
health care system: 
Health care in the United States is a 
current example of a vast social issue encrusted 
with a layer of invention and illusion. We 
all know there is something wrong with the 
current health care system, and it is commonly 
held that too few doctors, greedy insurance 
companies, and an apathetic government are 
a t fa ult.. Bu t are these the real problems? (22, p. ?31) • 
Twelve years hence Richardsonts comments rem~in 
pertinent. Hospital care expenditures have continued to 
rise dramatically, composing 5 percent of Gross National 
Product in 1982. Moreover, this rise in expenditure has 
occurred during a period of unprecedented inflation in the 
economy in general and in the health care sector in . 
particular. Indeed, while the consumer price index rose 36 
percent from 1973-1977, the hospital component of the cpr 
rose 64 percent. 
Many economists have suggested that the culprit 
responsible for the rampant inflation and spiraling 
expendi tures in the health care sector is medical insurance, 
which lowers the price which consumers pay, thus encouraging 
them to consume more. Furthermore, by largely divorb ing 
consumption decisions from price considerations, insurance 
has also been accused of contributing to the inflation of 
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health care costs. To determine the e ffect of insurance on 
the demand fer hospital care, a model of the demand for 
hospital care for the period 1973-1977 is estimated in this 
paper. By means of this estimation process , the 
responsiveness of consumers to the actual price they pay for 
hospital care can be determined. Although economists hav e 
previous ly estimated the effect of insurance on th e demand 
for hospital care, their analysiS has never accurately 
accounted for all types o£ insurance, i.e., private hospital 
insurance, Medicare hospital insurance, and Medicaid 
hospital insurance. Thu s , the model es timated in this paper 
represents an attempt to include all types of insurance in 
the estimatien process, so that the average price paid by 
th e consumer, as calculated in this research, reflects the 
influence and magnitude of public as well as private 
insurance. In aedition, this research will provide an 
esimate of the relative effects of public and private 
hospi tal ins tiranee on the dema nd for hospital care. 
The findings of this paper can briefly be summarized. 
inelastic. Demand, as measured by mean length of 
is \ v1tr 
stay, i s \ 
Demand, as measured by hospital admissisons rate, 
elastic. A given amount of public hospital insurance has a 
small, but significantly larger effect on demand, by either 
measure, than an equal amount of private hospital insurance. 
(!)rhese estimates can then be applied to several tOPics.l one 
such topic is the effect of the Reagan Administration's plan 
'1 
~'" 
to alter the Medicare benefit payment syste m. A second 
application measures the welfare loss (Martin Feldstein ' s 
phrase) of "excess" hospi ta 1 insurance co verage, and the 
gains which would occur if patients were forced to pay a 
larger share of total costs. Finally, suqqestions are made 
regarding st£uctural changes in private insurance 
contracts, and ways in which these proposed chanqes can 
alter incentives, and thus alleviate tile health C3.re crisis 
which plagues America. 
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Chapter 2 is a brief history of private hospital 
insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid. Chapter 3 is a review of 
pertinen~ literature. Chapter 4 de~cribes the methodoloqy 
used. Chapter 5 enumerates the.results. Chapter 6 offers 
interpretation of the results. Chapter 7 analyzes the 
implication s of the results obtained. Chapter 8 concludes 
the paper. 
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th e private hospital insurance market arose from the 
financial insta.bility of the Depression. The possibilty of 
catastrophic , expensive hospitalization provided an 
incentive for individuals to spread the risk of this 
occurrence through insurance. Simulta.eously, the 
possibility that individuals would be unable to pay for 
hospital ser vices led hospitals to seek financial protection 
through insurance a s well. From these two forces came Blue 
Cross. until very recently, the link between hospitals and 
Blue Cross has been guite strong, as the activities of Blue 
Cross were controlled by the American Hospital Association 
(27). In the 1940's commercial insurers (as distinguished 
from non-profit Blue Cros~ began to compete agqresively 
with Blue Cross by offering a slightly di f ferentiated 
product. Betore the entrance cf commercial insuL"ers,. Blu e 
Cross had used commu nity- ra ting to determine its premiums. 
That is, no distinction between higher- and lOWer-ri s k 
people was reflected in premiums; all individuals and groups 
paid essentially the same amount. Commercial insurers, on 
the ot her hand, e mployed experience-rating in the 
determination of premiums. This meant that the risk 
connected with a certain group was reflected in the premium 
5 1. 
.~~ . paid by members of that qroup, based on the group' s 
ch.aracteristics (age,sex,race,income). B ec a us e 0 f this 
policy commercial insure rs were able to lure low-risk 
> 
indi viduals awa y from Blue Cross by offer inq a lower premium 
for hos~ital insurance. Blue cross responded by adoptinq 
experience-rating, and vigorous competition ensued. Today, 
~3~ue Cross still dominate s th.e private insurance market, 




state, with a mean market s hare of 43 percent. -
The development of the private insurance market based 
upon experience-rating meant that neither Blue Cross nor 
commercial insurers could economically cover high-risk 
individuals. Foremost among high-cisk individuals were two 
major groups: the elderly and the indigent. To provide 
medical coverage for these two segments of society, Medicare 
and Medicaid, respectively, were instituted in 1966. Both. 
Medicare and Medicaid were products of President Johnson's 
Great Society program, and were approv e d under the auspices 
of the Social Security Amendments as Title XVIII and XIX, 
res pecti vel y. Medicare is composed of two parts: hospital 
insurance (Part A) and supplementary medical insurance (Part 
B) • Co 0 premiums ar~Picall!> charged for Medicare hospi tal 
benefits; instead, benefits are financed by means of the 
Social Security payroll tax. (Only the elderly who are not 
eligible for Social Security benefits must pay premiums.) 
Medicare recipients must, however, make a copayment equal to 
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the average ~rice o~ hospi ta l day for the first sixt y 
days ot hospitalization, and pay one-fourth of the copayment -
for each day fro m sixty-one through ninety. Finally, if all 
ninety days of coverage are exhausted, the Medicare 
beneficiary must pay one-half of the copayment for each d a y 
for additional care (each jedicare recipient has a lifetime 
reserve of sixty such days.) In contrast to ~edicare,which 
is completely administered by the federal government, 
Medicaid is fu .nded both by the federal government and local 
governments. Each state determines the size of its direct 
Medicaid payments, and the federal government suppli~s 
matching funds based upon the state's own allocation. All 
states except Arizona participat e in Medicaid, and benefits 
vary greatly fro:n state to state. Approximately half of th'e 
~edicaid proqram is financed through federal general 
revenues; th e other half comes from state and local funds. 
Although some states exercise the option to charge premiums 
to Medicaid beneficiaries who have a ce-rtain level of income 
or higher, the vast majority of Medicaid revenues corne 
directly from income taxes. Finally, Medicaid in its 
original formulation placed no limit on the number of days 
of hospital care covered. Although some states have 
gradually added limitations, relaxation of these 
restrictions is often allowed because of "medical necessity" 
(23) • 
Two theoretical notions have deve~o ped to explain th e 
e ffect which health insurance has upon the dem~nd for 
medical care. They are mcral hazard and welfare loss. 
Moral hazard is defined by Paul Feldstein in this way: 
"Since insurance lowers the price of medical care to 
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individuals, they will consume more care than if they had to 
pay the entire price themselves" (10,p. 118). l10ral hazard, 
then is the movement down the demand curve in respon se to 
the lover efJ~gti~ price of medical care. This lower 
effective price occurs because, with insurance coverage,the 
individual pays a fraction of the total price. The 
proportion which the individual remits is the coinsurance 
rate. Thus, if an insurance policy stipula tes that 80 
percent of an individual's medicial expenses will be paid, 
the corresponding coinsurance rate is 20 percent. ~oral 
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~ ithout insuranc e the individual initially chooses QG units 
of medical care at price Po. with the introduction of (l-k) 
percent insurance coverage, the individual move s down the 
demand curve to consume Q. units of medical care, where the 
effective price is the coinsurance rate times ' the original 
price, kPo • The loss to the indi vidual when moral hazard 
occurs is shewn by the shaded triangle ABC. The derivation 
of ABC a s a measure of moral hazard ~oss can be 
geometrically described. The market value of the consum e r' s 
original choice, (00 ,Po)' is represen ted by the rectangle OPo 
AQo • When the individua 1 increases nis con sum ption to Q 1 
the market value of the additional consumption is QoIBQ,. 
The rea s on that market value eguals QoABQ" and not OkPo CQ. ' 
as is t ypically the cas e in d e mand theory, is that the ~rue 
0\«',\ tt'..J.t CJIr;)\ , 
price of each unit is still Po, although the ~rice"to the 
individual has been reduced. Of the value of the additional 
tc= \o.,,~~ ~K 
care which is consumed, the ~~a ~~, is realized as . 
~-u..a. r"~o-~,, ~C.Q,<:?o·'-~  ot~ ~~ l~\....J.. ~ ~ ~':>~.t . 
consumer 1 s s urplus Thus, the remaining region, ABC, is 
dead-weight loss. 
Why, then, does moral hazard occur? Pauly (17) and 
Arrow (2) attribute the occurrence of this phenomenon to 
informational inefficiency and the special nature of the 
medical market and product(s). For both Pauly and Arrow the 
root of moral hazard is individual preventive behavior, or 
lack thereof. Although, as'Arrow maintins, "illness is to a 
considerable extent an unpredictable phenomenon," individual 
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behavior suc h as inactivity , smokinq, and poor diet can 
increase the prol:ability of medical expense (2,p. 945). One 
informational inefficiency occurs p.recisely because insurers 
cannot monitor the behavior of individuals. Thus, in 
specifying the conditions of an insurance contract, it is 
impossible to distinguish between avoidable and unavoidable 
cisks. As a result, incentives to lim.it activities which 
promote "avoidable" losses are difficult to incorporate in 
insurance contracts. The optimal insurance contract, then, 
is one in which the insured bears a portion of the costs he 
incurs to the insurer--a contract in which the "optimal 
trade-off between conflicting goals of furtherinq risk 
spreading and providing appropriate incentives" occurs 
(17,p.46). Another informational inefficiency which 
prevent s accurate determination of expected losses by 
insurers is noted by Pauly. Because the possession of 
insurance increases the consumption of medical care, 
insurers *' function estimate their expected losses to be an increasing -of the amount of insurance held by their clients. 
Insurers are not aware, however, of the total insurance 
holdings of their clients, as individuals may hold policies 
with several firms simultaneously. In fact, other insurers 
have strong incentives to conceal their sales, and as a 
result, premiums will be set inappropriately low to cover 
the true expected loss of insured individuals. At this 
lower price insurance is overconsumed relative to Pauly· s 
10 
" second best optimum", where premiums ~rid expected l oss es 
are directly related. (Pauly's true optimum is defined as 
the case in which premiums vary with participation in 
activities which increase the probability of illness~ ) 
Other' informational ine££iciences which cause 
insurance-holding to be excessive, and thu s losses from 
moral hazard to occur, pertain to informational problems 
with the medical product. Two special characteristics of 
the medical market which are cited relate to the behavior of 
physicians and the inadequate incorporation , o~ information 
regarding the medical product in insurance contracts. Arro w 
describes the physician as a figure of trust who i s bound by 
the ethical restriction s of his profession. These ethical 
restrictions can te thought of in the context of the 
phys.ician's agency relationship with the patient; that is , 
the physician is purportedly committed to act in his 
patient ' s best interests . Accordingly, the physician i s 
charged with the duty of saving and enhancing life while not 
prescriting excessive treatment merely to increase his own 
income . If the physician fulfills these ethical 
stipulations, his agency relationship with the patient i s 
complete_ . Pauly and Redisch, however, guestion the 
completeness of the agency relationship, a nd suggest that 
the physician's frimary motive is to maximize income (18). 
1/ , with this possibility, and the prevalence of insurance, it 
seems plausillle that the Fhysician exacerbates the moral 
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hazard problem. Zeckhauser (26) examines another of the 
inherent problems of the medical market which leads to moral 
hazard--the lack of distinction in insurance plans among 
various medical procedures. Because of the multi-product 
nature of the hosfital, and even intra-product differences 
{severity of illness,complementary procedures), insurance 
contracts do not distinguish between different classes of 
conditions. Zeckhauser shows that withotit distinctions in 
claims reimbursement, excessive spending occurs for all 
possible conditions. To provide adequate.coverage 
simul taneous ly with incen ti ves to limit expenses, Zeckha user 
proposes differentia ted reimbursement based upon the type of 
illness. Although he admits that a plan with distinction 
oetween every type of procedure is too costly to be 
realistic, he suggests that distinctions be made amonq 
~arious classes of illness. Zeckhauser's model shows that 
the marginal coinsurance rate with class distinctions is 
higher than the coinsurance rate without distinctions, 
providing incentives for "appropriate" expenditure while 
still spreading risk. 
The loss from moral hazard, however, is only part of the 
total effect on individual welfare which insurance-holding, 
and its implications for price and quantity determination, 
has. Martin Feldstein (8) examines this total effect, 
referred to as welfare loss, in his 1973 article. Feldstein 
maintains that moral hazard loss is an exaggerated measure 
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ior several reasons. First, he claims that because 
insurance raises the gross price {i.e., price with no 
insurance coverage), demand does not increase as much as it 
would have, had gross price re mained at its original level. 
Second, Feldstein suggests that the higher price way denote 
h igher quali ty, which causes demand to shift. Third, if the 
higher price does indicate higher quality, then total 
welfare loss is further reduced. Crucial to Feldstein' s 
analysis is bis treatment of quality and the change in 
quality~ Feldstein states that, "The increased gross price 
(i. e. ,cost) t:er patient day provides a service that is of 
higher gua:l ity ~ .E~ rce-i ved ..E.Y j:he hO§.B.i!s.l" (8, pp. 267- 8) • 
Feldstein continues his analysis by stating that if patients 
perceiv~ the new, higher price to manifest an increase in 
quality, demand will increase. He makes no binding 
assumpt-ion in his e mpirical anal ysis, however, about whether 
this demand shift actually occurs, as h e calculates welfare 
loss with demand shift factors of 0, .?3, and .67. 
Nevertheless, he describes these somewhat arbitrary 
estimate s of demand shif t magnitude as "moderate and 
rela ti vely conser vati ve" (8 ,p. 269) • 
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Welfare loss, a s described above, can be qr a phical1y 




I nitially the consumer purchases 00 units at price PD. The 
introduction of insurance (coinsurance rate =k) increases the 
gross price of care to ~ , and thus the effective, or net, 
price to the consumer i s k~ .If the consumer perceives th e 
new, higher gross price PI to be a reflection of a quali"ty 
increase, then the demand curve shifts up from D to De. To 
consume the original amcunt of hospital care, Qo' a price of 
P~ must be paid. Th e new equilibrium thlls becomes(Q, ,kP. ). 
The amount of welfare loss is represented by the shaded 





The rectangle PI ACPl- corresponds to the first term, 
in the welfare loss equation. It represents tbe loss that 
occurs due to the effect of insurance after the demand 
shift. That is, the price per unit of care for the oriqinal 
quantity demanded is P1 after the demand shift, but after 
demand shifts ~'!!.Q insurance i s introduced the price is P, . 
Thus the rectangle constructed by the multiplication of .~ 
and (P, -P2 ) represents one portion of the dead-weight loss. 
The remaining loss area, trapezoid ABEC, can be derived in a 
manner similar to that in which moral hazard loss was 
derived. In moving down the demand curve from QD to Q" the 
total market value of the additional care consumed is the 
Fe. E o-S-:\l~  ~ ~ \?~ "-I\...:J.-
rectangl e ABQ.Qo. The consumer' s s urplus , ~Q ,~ \ 
~ ~ ~, F'EGt,Ct'o, ~ 
" s ubtracted from this, leaving trapezoid ABBe as dead-weight 
loss. This quantity, added t~ P, ACP%, constitutes the total 
welfa~e loss resultant from the introduction of insurance. 
Feldstein applies this formulation of welfare loss to 
demand estimation and thus produces estimates of existing 
welfare losses. The demand-far-insurance equation is 
estimated, with both quantity of insurance and proportion of 
population enrolled as dependent variables. Independent 
variables are gross price of hospital care, price of health 
insurance (ratio. of pJ:emiums to benefits), proportion of 
employees in manUfacturing or government (i.e., those lik ely 
to have group coverage), per capita income, an income 
variable weighted by the distribution of insurance, the 
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dependent variable lagged, and a composite variable which 
includes price and income elasticities of demand for 
hospital care. ('Ihese price and income elasticities are the 
results of a previous study (6), which will be discussed in 
detail telow.) Feldstein's most important result from this 
estimation is the value of the elasticity of demand for 
insura.nce with respect to the price o.f hospital ca.re. This 
elasticity is significantly positive both when quantity of 
insurance is the dependent variable and when proportion 
enrolled is the dependent variable. Feldstein then PP&ee-eds. 
M sho wS theoretically tna t an increase in insurance 
increases the price of hospital care by shifting the demand 
curve outward. Thus, an increase in the price of hospital 
care increases the quantity of insurance demanded; an 
increase in . the quantity of insurance demanded increases the 
price of hospital care. Despite this mutual dependence, 
Feldstein is able to use difference equations to prove that 
the markets for hospital insurance and hospital care are 
stable. 
Finally, Feldstein rewrites the welfare loss equation in 
order to calculate the magnitude of that loss. He 
substitutes J for P, I~ (gross price change resulting from 
the introduction of insurance), 1\ for (P,. -Po) I (P, -Pol 
(increase in guality as perceived by patients), price 
elastic! ty E for (dX/dkP) (kP/Q) when that expression is 
evaluated at P
1
, and- (P,. -kP.) CJQIJkP) for (Q, -Qo) • After 
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these substitutions welfare loss is expressed as a function 
(2) wL={(1-A) (J-1) .. -E/2[J{1-kt-C1-A) {J-1)][ (1"A(J-1}-kJ.)J(1.A{J-l»}P~Qo 
where J=gross pr ice change from in troduction of insurance 
A=guality change as perceived by patients 
E=net price elasticity of demand for hospital care 
~=original price 
o.=original guan ti ty demanded. 
Feldstein assign s several values to the parameters J, A, and 
E in order to estimate welfare 1055 for 1969. His estimates 
range from $2.4 billion to $6 billion depending upon hi s 
choice of parameter values. 
TO calculate welfare loss, as specified above, it is 
necessary first to calculate price elasticity of demand. 
For this reason, and because one of the purposes of this 
paper is to compare the effects of private and public 
hospi tal insurance on the dema,nd for hospital care, the 
existing literature regarding the demand for hospital care 
must be examined. A particular point of contention in 
demand studies is the price elasticity of demand; indeed, 
the only conclusicn upon which all studies agree is that 
price elasticity lies betwe.en 0 and 1. Also, Phelps and - ':) 
Newhouse raise the question of functional form--that is, is 
linear or log-log form preferable? 
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Feldstein estimates the demand equation for 1959 - 1965 in 
his 1971 article ~). He estimates two basic functions 
which are in the logarithms of the variables (except for 
variables TIME and MCAID, which are simply linear) : 
(3) log(W =a +b*log(RNP} +c*log(INC)+d*TIME+f*log(DENS) tq*MCAID+ ~ 
(~) log CQ) =a +b*log(RP) +c *log (INS) +d*log (INC) +f*T!::1E+q*loq (DENS) +h*MCA.ID+~ 
whe re RNP=relative net price (gross price ti~es coinsurance rate 
deflated by the consumer price index) 
BP=relative price (gross pri ce deflated by the consumer 
price index) 
INS =es timated coinsurance rate (consumer expenditures on 
hospital care divided by total (insurance,qovernment,consumer ) 
expenditures on hospital care) 
INC=real per capita disposable income 
TIHE=timE trend to represent technical progress and changing 
~opular attitudes about hospital care 
DEN S=population density 
MCAID=dummy variable equal to 1/12 for each month in which a 
state had a Medicaid program in a given year;O otherwise. 
Feldstein uses two different dependent variables--rate of 
[
hospital adm iss ions and mean length of stay in days--both of 
which are adjusted for demographic composition~ Using 
instrumental variables estimation Feldstein obtains relative 
net price el~sticiti es of admission of -.63 and a relative 
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net price elasticity of s tay of -.49, both of which are 
significant at higher than the 99 percent level of 
confidence. When se parate relative price and coin s urance 
rate elasticities ar e es timated, the elasticities of 
admission are -.55 and -.69, respectively, and the 
e lasticities of stay are -.39 and -.58, respectively. All 
of thes€ coefficients are significant at greater than 99 
percent .confidence. Income elasticity of admission is .08 
and is s ignificant at 99 percent; income elasticity of stay 
is .46 and is significant at higher than 99 percent. When 
relative price and the coinsurance rate are separate 
variables, the income elasticity of admission is .015 and 
the income elasticity of stay is .378: the former is 
insignificant, the latter significant at gr.eater than 99 
percent. Finally, the Medicaid dummy coefficient is -.08 in 
the admissions equation and .908 in the mean stay equation; 
the former is significant at greater than 99 percent, the 
latter insignificant. When relative price and the 
coinsurance rate are treated separately, the Medicaid 
coefficient in the admissions equation is -.09 and it is 
.006 in the mean stay equation; the former is significant a t 
greater than 99 percent, the latter insignificant. 
In summary, Feldstein finds significant ne~ price 
elasticities ranging from -.~9 to -.69, with t .he higher 
absolute values occurring in the admissions rate equation. 
Income elasticities are in the .4-.5 range and highly 
significant for the mean stay equation; for the admission s 
rate equation, one significant value of .08 is obtained. 
The coefficients of the Medicaid dummy are h~qhly 
significant and close to -. 1 in the admissions rate 
equations; in the mean stay equations they are 
insignificant. Concerning the M~dicaid coefficients, 
however, Feldstein rightfully warns that they "should be 
regarded with great caution", considering his fairly crude 
method of estimation (6,p.860). 
Feldstein presents a slightly revised version of this 
demand model in 1977 (7). Despite strong similarities in 
specification to his earlier model, Feldstein's 1977 model 
yields markedly different estimates. Two different 
functions are used: 
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(5) log,ADMD)=a+b*log{RNP)+c*log{Q) ta*TIMEte*log(GP} tf*loq(BEDS) 
+g*log(DENSI!Y)+h*MCAID+! 
(6) log(MSD)=a+b*log(BNP)+c*loq(Q)+d*log{INC) +f*loq (GP) +g* log(BEDS) 
+h*log(DENSITY)+j*MCAID+e, 
where ADMD=admissions rate per capita 
MSD=mean length of stay in days in the hospital 
Q=quality, defined as average cost per patient day, 
deflated by an input price index 
GP=general practitioners per capita 
20 
BEDS=the s upply of bed-day s (365*the numbe~ of a vailable beds). 
All other variables are defined as in the 1971 study. 
explanation is given for the exclusion of TIME from the 
equation and the similar exclusion of INC from the ADMD 
equatLon. Perhaps Feldstein believes that income does not 
affect the rate of admissions; if so, why was INC not 
included so that its insignificant coefficient cou.ld be 
empirically verified? Another possible explanation is that 
INC and TIME are highly correlated. Instrumental variables ~p 
estimation was performed for the periods 1959-1973, 
1959-1965, and 1966-1973 for each dependent variabl€. Net ~ "'-... 
""""'- • 2.1 
price elasticities of admission for the three periods are 
-.044, -.042, and -.236, respectively; the first and .third 
values are significant at the 99 percent level ,the second "iy 
is insignificant. Net price elasticities of stay are 
.02 ' .-080, and .005, respectively; the negative value i s 
. X?" • 
~ >"~ 'Ignificant at greater than 99 percent. Quality. 
'xP 0/ elastici ties of admission are ,209, .543, and • ~1.J2, 
~ r:spectivelY; all are significant at greater than 99 
~~ percent. Quality elasticities of mean stay are -.172, .1)22 
and -.200, respectively;the negative values are significant 
at greater than 90 percent. Income elasticities are found 
only in the mean stay equation. Their values are .059, 
.053, and .038, respectively; the first value is significant 
-. 'LO 
2 1 
at the 96 pe~cent level . The general practitioners 
elasticities of stay are .004, .026, and .014, respectively; 
the second value is significant at the 93 percent level. 
Th'e GP elasticities of stay are -.017, -.022, and -.023, 
respectively; the first is significant at 83 perce nt, the 
third at 85 percent. pinally, the MCIIO dummy coeff~cients 
are only estimated for two of the three periods, 1959- 1973 
and 1966-1973, as Medicaid did not exist before 1966. In 
the admissions rate equation, the estimated coefficients are 
- .0 27 and -.006, respectively; the former is significant at 
greater than 99 percent. In the mean stay equation the 
values are .019 and -.006,respectively; the former is 
significant at greater than 99 percent. 
In summary, the net price elasticity of ad mission is 
estima-ted to have markedly increased after the introduction 
of Medicaid, with a value of -.2 for 1966-1973. The net 
price elasticity of stay is only signficant for 1959-1965, 
when it has a value of -.08. Feldstein does not comment 
upon the major inconsistency between these estimates and his 
197 1 values, which are substantially larger in absolute 
1-
value: approximately -. ~ for admissions and approximatel y 
+ 
- • • for mean stay. Quality is estimated to have a 
significantly positive effect upon admissions and a 
significantly negative effect upon length of stay. The 
latter effect probably occurs because quality, as it is 
defined in the model and, to some extent, in actuality, 
22 
directly reflects cost. Income i s estimated to have a 
small, s ignificant effect over the entire period; its 
elasticity is approximately .06. The availability of 
general practitioners increase s the admissions rate and 
decreases mean stay; these results are not always 
siqnifican t, howe ver. P ina1l y, the :1edicaid du mmy , altho uqh 
a crude measure~ent~ has a neqative effect on admissions and 
a positivE ODe on mean stay for the entire period. 
Bosett and Huang alsD estimate the demand for medical 
car e (20)~ Using 1960 data from the survey of Consumer 
Expenditures they first estimate th e expenditure function 
for medical care in two equations--one for ,uninsured 
households, the ether for insured households: 
(7) M=a t bYf·c /tdD + E 




where M=total household expenditure on medical care 
Y=income 
D=direct household expenditures on medical care 
k =proportion paid by insurer (l-coinsurance rate). 
Due to the nature of their data set, Eosett and Huanq were 
required to estimate M and k. Although this slightly 
weakens their results,. they acknowledge this shortcoming and 
make an effort to calculate the bias which occurs. 
~hile we cannot infer from the results we qet 
that k and M, could we observe them both directly, 
would te related as the regression says they are, we 
can infer that they would be related more 
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or less as the regression says they are, provided 
insurance premiums depend on k and M as hypothesized. 
In short, .e have estimated M so as to be consistent 
with the assumption that insurance companies calculate 
their premiums to reflect their actuarial costs (20,p.287). 
Aiter performing a simulation of the relationship between ~ and k, 
they suggest that their estimating procedure introduces a downward 
bias in the slope of approximately 10 percent; that is, M is biased ._--------_. } 
~===--\ -~----
downward by about 10 percent. 
After estimating the expenditure ~~ 
~ --------
function, Rosett and Huan'g transform expenditur~,,-----__ _ 
equation (8) into a demand equation by artifici~lly creating a quantity 
variable whose units have a price of 51.00 each. 
The transformed equation is: 
(9) Q=a+bY+cl'+drtfrYtglth.z tjzrtkzl.t: 
where r=l-k=coinsurance rate 
Z=a .normally distributed random variable with a zero 
mean and a standard deviation, Gi. 
The estimated coefficients of this demand function are: Y, 
~ -~ ~ 
.94181; Y, -.3026 X 10; r, 625.1; rY, .03031; r, 468.17; Z, 
1. 
876.48; Zr, -876.48; and Zr, 219.12. No standard errors are 
provided. By substituting a range of values for Z a family 
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of demand curves is created, each corresponding to a certain 
distributional level of insurance-holding. 'From these 
demand functions price and income elasticities are 
generated. Estimated demand e~~ies vary from -.35 
for r=.2 to -1.5 for r=.S. Income elasticity estimates vary C Lp 
from .25 for 1=$4,000 to .~5 for Y=$10,000. Finally, from 
these ·elasticities, Rosett and Huang calculate a crude 
"measure of household welfare loss for given levels of income 
and coinsurance rates. The loss which they compute is the 
difference between marginal cost and utility value to the 
consumer as he moves down the demand curve, a move induced 
by insurance. One example of this type of analysis which 
they cite is that, by their es timation, a family with income 
of $7,000 paid 2.5 times the actuarial value of a ~ 
k-ess te fJE'etect it:se±£ aq-a-:i:-n-st i) "highly probable" $110 
loss. t. : ... s,"", ~~'\ ~~\ \\..:~ 'l_. 
Finally, Phel~s and Newhouse also estimate the demand 
for hospital care (19). Prior to this estimation, however, 
th-ey di::cuss several theoretical aspects of the demand for 
hospi tal care. They sim ply state two relationships which 
are derived elsewhere. These are: {t)the elasticity of 
demand with respect to the gross price of medical care is 
egual to the elasticity of demand with respect to the 
coinsurance 'rate, and (2) the elasticity of demand with 
respect to the consumer' s wage is equal to the elasticity of 
demand with respect to time allotted per unit of medical 
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care consumed. From these relationships Phelps and Newhouse 
draw seven implicaticns, one of which is of particular 
relevance in this research. They state: 
Goods with proportionally high time-price / components 
and nearly complete insurance coverage (~insurance rate 1 
near zero) will show relatively small mobey-price 
and coinsurance elasticities and relatively high 
time-price elasticities •• ~.Hospital days might 
••• be an example, although if one is seriously ill 
enough to be hospitalized, the opportunity cost of time 
will generally fall and with it the time-price (19,p.335). 
This hypothesis has implications for the interpretation of 
price elasticity and for the treatment of time-price in this 
research, both of which will be discussed later. Phelps and 
NewhousE present the demand elasticities for hospital care 
using beth ~dmisssions rate and mean stay as dependent 
variables. ~bey use, Connecticut data for the period 
1966-1968, a period in which a change in the coinsurance 
rate took place. Employing a linear specification they 
1,;. --
d ' 1 t' 'tVJ\'f d"" f 05 d ~scover an ea~c~ y 0 a m1ss~ons 0 -. an an 
elasticity of mean stay of -.02. (No in£ormation is given 
on significance.) These figures are arc elasticities 
computed over the range of zero to 25 percent coinsurance 
which they designate "policy relevant".. As a result of 
their findings, Phelps and Newhouse reject the null 
hypothesis that price has no effect on the consumption of 
hospital care. The scenario which they reject is one in 
which the physician makes all choices regarding the amount 
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of care his Fatient consumes; that is, price is irrelevant 
to the consumer. Bather, price has a small but siqnificant 
negative effect on the consumption of hospital care. 
finally, they raise the issue of functional form. They 
assu~elinear demand curves (as do Bosett and Huang), 
although constant elasticity form is more typical. Of this 
distinction they comment, 
We de not know hew sensitive the results in the 
literature are to this assumption 
[constant elasticity]: because our results generally 
come from the observation of two points, we are 
not well equipped to test for differences in functional 
form. However, we believe our results 
are accurate for the ranges given (19,p.335). 
It is evident in surveying the literature-of demand 
estimation that substantial disagreement exists regarding 
the price elasticity of demand for hospital care. Although 
most if not all economists agree that the elasticity of 
demand lies between zero and negative one, and is 
significantly different from zero, estimates vary widely as 
to its value within that range. Feldstein's early estimates 
of elasticities (6) range from -.39 to -.69 depending upon 
which specification is used, elasticities of admission 
falling within the more negative end of that range. These 
estimates are fairly consistent with those of Rosett and 
Huang, who-find that demand elasticity is -.35 when a 20 
percent coinsurance rate is in effect. Phelps and NeWhouse, 
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however, dis FU te these es tima te s and maintain tha t the tt"ue 
elasticity is much lcwet" in absolute value: -.02 or -. 0 5 , 
depending on which quantity measure is chosen. Feldstein 
contradicts his own 1971 estimates in a later article (7), 
offering estimates ranging from -.04 to -.2 for different 
time periods and specifications. Mysteriously, Feldstein' s 
1977 model is almost identical to his 1971 version, the 
major difference being the inclusion of q uality as an 
independent variable. Furthermore, Feldstein even sampl es 
the same time period (1959-1965) in both studies, but 
obtains strikingly divergent results: -.63 and -.49 for 
admissions rate apd mean stay, respectively, in the earlier 
study, compa red with -.042 and -.080 in the later study. 
perhaps this i~consistency is attributable to the different 
methods used to construct the coinsurance t"ate in each 
study. In the 1971 papet Feldstein defines the coinsuran ce 
rate as! 
(10) INS= (consumer: expenditures on hospital care) / (insurance +qovernment+ 
consumer expenditures on hospital care) 
The 1977 paper contains a another definition! 
(11-) INS=PENE*PCCINS •. (1-PENR) G*GCOINS 
where PEtJR=proporticn of population enrolled in pri vate 
health insurance plus Medicare 
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PCOINS=average coinsurance rate of private s ubscribers 
GCOIN S= ~~oportion of hospital costs of those without insuran c e 
that are not paid by government programs but must 
be paid by the uninsured themselves . 
Although Feldstein fails to include Medicaid coverage as 
well as Medicare coverage, Medicaid benefits are a 
relatively small .fraction cftotal hospital insurance 
benefits, and thus are almost certainly not the cause of the 
major difference in estimates. Because the coinsurance rate 
he calculates is a national average, Feldstein admits that 
the "adequacy of this estimate will be limited bV the extent 
to which the effective c oinsurance rate for private 
insurance and the comprehensiveness of government hospital 
insurance for the po~r differ among the states" (7,p.1692). 
He fails, however, to discuss the full implication s of th ese 
state-to-state differences on his net price elasticity 
estimates, and generally ignores the contradictory results 
of his earlier work. 
Greater agreement seems to exist on income elasticities. 
Feldstein obtains a mean stay elasticity of .08 and 
admissions rate elasticities in the .4-.5 range in his 1971 
study. The 1917 study includes income only in the 
v-.~s~ 
~·j.-s·S±S-o:n;s ~ equatiQn; it s coefficient is .6. In 
addition, Rosett and Huang find income e lasticity to vary 
from .25 to .45 depending upon income. 
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Little a ttempt has teen mad e to measure the relatiave 
effects of public and private hospital insurance on the 
demand for hospital care. Feldstein' s admittedly crude 
Medicaid dummy variable does have a s ignificantly neqative 
sign, leading Feldstein to conclude that "Medicaid does not 
increase the admissions rate by as much as an egual amount 
of private insurance ~ould" (7,p.1696). This deduction 
seems tenuou s , as to merely indicate the presence or absence 
af M ~dicaid reveals nothing abcut its relative proportion 
and effects. 
Finally, functional form, althouqh not the sub;ect of 
much debate, is an area of ~isagreement in the literature. 
No attempt has been made, however, to justify the use of 
e1 ther log-leg or li near . demand form. 
Chapter II •• ..... 
The model of the market for hospital services 
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l' • • 
W.11~Cll loS 
analyzed in this Faper hopefully w~ll prpvide more definite 
answers to the unresolved questions posed by previous de mand 
studies. Moreover, an attempt will be made to measure the 
effects of the di .fferen·t J:uhlic-pri vate insurance mixes 
which characterizE the various states. That is, w~at is the 
effect on demand of a smaller (or larger) proportion of 
public insurance? Is the behavior of public insurance 
beneficiaries revealed to differ from the behavior of 
private insurance beneficiaries? !nswers to these 
questions, in addition to estimates of price and income 
elasticities of demand, will then provide a framework within 
which to comment upon such issues as the Reagan 
Administration's recent Medicare proposal and the inherent 
problems with insurance contracts, especially private ones, 
as they are · formulated today. 
The model which represents the market for hospital 
services consists of two equations, although only the demand 




(1 2) j\ (2=a+b*log (NPBI) +c*log(OAGE) +d*log (INC) +f*log (OU'l'P) 
+g*log (GPS) th*log (MALE) +;*log (i,HIT) +k*log (PPRV) +l*loq (CA~C) .. l... 
where NPRI=relati ve average total price of one day of hospi tal care 
CAGE=proportion of people 65 and over 
INC=real per capita income 
COTP=number of outpatient facilities per capita 
GPs=number of non-federal general practitioners per capita 
~ALE=proportion of males 
WHIT=~roportion of whites 
FPRV=proportion of total hospital ,insurance benefits comprised 
by private hospital insurance benefits 
CANC=rate of death from cancer (per 100,000 population). 
The supply argument is: 
(13) Q=Q(NPRI,SAL,PINP,INT,HSP) 
where SAL=rea~ average salary of full-time hospital personnel 
PINP=a vector of prices for all non-labor inputs 
INT=rate of interest on purchased capital 
HSP=number cf hospitals per capita. 
As ~n other studies, two quantity measures are used: admissions 
per capita and mean lenqthof stay in days. 
observations were collected for the five-year period 
1973-1977 for the fifty states and the District of Columbia. 
These 255 observations were extracted from a number of 
1? 
-'-
different statistical sources; in addition, many variable s 
were constructed from several individual figures. 
Therefore, a detailed description and definition of the 
variables in the model is warranted. 
Admissions rate per capita (AD~I) is the constructed 
quotient of total annual hospital admissions and population. 
The number of admission s was taken from llQ~ital Statis1i£§, 
the annual publication of the American Hospital Association. 
Population data was taken from the ~tisti~21 ~~!~£1 Ql 
Relative net price of hospital services CNPEI) is the 
constructed product of gross (total) price 6f one day of 
hospitalization and the coinsurance rate--the proportion of 
the price paid by the consumer-- divided by the consumer 
price index. (This price is, of course, strictly a 
money-price; the issue of time-price is considered 
elsewhere.) The coinsurance rate itself is also a 
constructed variatle. It s formula is: 
(14 ) CC~N='-(PRIV.MCAR.MCAI)/PAY 
where PEIV=real total private insurance hospi ta I 
MCAR=real total Medicare hospi tal benefit s 





PAy=real total payments for hospital care, both direct 
by individuals, and indirect through all 
forms of hospital insurance. 
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Thus the second term on the right side of the equation is 
the fraction of total hospital expenditures covered by all 
forms of insurance; when it is subtracted from one th,e 
coinsurance rate remains. All coinsurance rates calculated 
are individual state rates, rather than one national rate, 
which Feldstein uses. This provides a much more accurate 
measure of state-to-state differences in insurance coverage. 
PBlV was constructed by taking total health insurance 
benefits paid in each state from the §ource Book .Qi Health 
Insurance Data - - (Health Insurance 
Institute) and multiplying it by the proportion ~hich 
hospital benefits are of total health benefits for the 
nation, which was taken from Healt~ £~~ lin~ing Revi~~. 
As a result, this estimate is biased for states whose 
residents receive proportionally more or less hospital 
coverage. Medicare values were taken from the ~tati~~ical Abstract 
• Medicaid values were taken from Medical 
Assistance Financed Under Title XIX 
Ac~. Total payments were taken from !!.Q§Ei tal Statistics. 
Because PAY values applied to community 
hospitals, while PRIV, MCAR, and MCAI values applied to all 
hospitals, PAY was multiplied by the national ratio of total 
hospital expenditures to community hospital expenditures for 
each year. Thus, this estimate does not account for 
di~ferences in community hospital market share across 
states. 
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The p~oPQrtion of people 65 and over (GAGE) was taKen 
from the Statistical Abstract. Actual percentages were 
available for 1975-1977;OAGE was constructed for 1973-1974 
by dividing the number of people 65 and over ~y the 
estimated population. Per capita income was taken from the 
d~~tiSsl Abstr~. and was deflated by the consumer 
price index to obtain real per capita income (INC). Per 
capita income values were based on nominal income estimates 
developed for Federal r e venue-sharing allocations. 
Outpatient facilities per capita (OUTP) was constructed by 
dividin~ the n~mber of "organized outpatient departments" 
per state by population. The number o .f outpatient 
facilities was found in BOS.Ei~l ~tatis!i£2. General 
practitioners per capita (GPS) was calculated in a manner 
analogous to OUTP. The number of non-federal general 
practitioners (no information wa s available on federal 
general practitioners) came from Phys!cia~ 2istributign ani 
M~dical_licensure in the United State§. , an annual 
American Medical Association publication. 
The proportion of males (MALE) and the proportion of 
whites (WHIT) in each state vere found in Q~m2g~phic, 
social, and Economic Prof ile of .:Ehe .§ta te2.· Unfortunatel y, 
this data only applied to 1976, and other years were not 
available. Because it is reasonable to assume, however, 
that these proportions changed little in most states within 
five years, the 1976 value for each state was used each 
year. 
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The proportion which private hospit~l insurance 
nenefit s comFrise of total hospital insurance benefits 
(PPRV) was computed by taking the quotient of total priva t e 
insurance hospital benefits --(PBlV), and the sum of PRIV, 
total Medicaid hospital benefits (MCAl), and total Medicare 
hospi tal benefits (MCAR) . 
The rate of death frem cancer (CANC) was taken from the 
~!j,§.!.icaJ. Abstract and it measu.res the number of annual 
deaths from malignant neoplasms per 100,000 population. 
Data was also collected for the two instruments used to 
conduct two-stage least squares reqressionsa _ The first 
instrument is average salary of full-time hospital personnel 
(SAL) • This data was taken frem l!Q§Ei~al Statistics and 
selecteg Community Hospital ll!dic~.Q£.a, another American 
Hospital Association pUblication. SAL is the quotient of 
payroll and total full-time hospi tal personnel. SAL was 
directly available for 1975-1976, and was computed for 1973, 
, 9 7 4 , an d 1 9 7 7 • 
Finally, the number of hospitals per capita (HSP) was 
constructed by dividing tetal hospitals by total population. 
The number of hospitals was found in !!osEital ~t!stic2. 
/ 
/ Defined as such, what do these variables purport to 
measure, and why were they chosen rather than other 
conceivable alternatives? The quantity of hospital care can 
be measu~ed in seve~al different ways --admissions rate, 
mean length of stay, or patient days demanded, which is the 
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product of the first twa. Both admisssions rate and mean 
s tay are preferable to patient days demanded preci se ly 
because the act of entering a ho s pi tal and the length of 
time which one stays are two different things. Thus, in 
constructing patient days demanded, a state with low 
admissions aDd lang ~tays will appear the same as a state 
with high admissions and short stays, when in reality, two 
very different sets of societal preferences are revealed. 
Because patient days demanded obscures this difference, 
admisssions rate and mean stay ar e better measures. Is one 
of these two measures s uperior to the other as an index of 
the demand fcr hospital care? To attempt to answer this 
question, on e must e xamine the nature of product which 
hospital care is. Unlike that for most products, the 
revealed behavior of con s umption of hospital care is not 
completely the result of the consumer' s own decision. 
Instead, the asymmetry of information between physician and 
patient regarding the latterts medical condition 
necessitates that the patient all6w the physician to act as 
his agent. As noted above, however, the agency relationship 
is incompl~te; one consequence of this incompleteness is the 
prescription of unnecessary care, which if the patient were 
fully informed (or had to pay more of the cost), would not 
be consumed. On the cthe r hand, because individuals are 
able to obtain "second opinions" and possess some knowledge 
of the seriousness of ailments and neccesity of treatment, 
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they retain some decision-making po wer. Because the 
specification of a demand function attempts to explain the 
factors which affect demand, it is most desirable to choose 
a definition of guantity demanded whose value is the most 
affected by individual choice. Indeed, if the individual 
has limited choice regarding the quantity he consumes as 
measured in a particular way, the determinants of demand, 
i.e., price, income, etc., while actually having little 
effect upon demand, may appear to significantly affect 
demand in statistical testing. Thus, the best definition 
for quantity demanded is one wh ich is influenced by 
individual choice; that is, a definition of guantity 
demanded such that it systematically varies with variations 
in its determinants. Although both the admissisons rate and 
mean stay are chosen for the patient, to some extent, by 
physiCians, both contain some elements of choice, and 
compelling arguments can be presented that each is more of a 
choice variable than the ether. A physician's 
recommendation is not sufficient to ensure that his patient 
will choose hospital admission; the patient may decide 
otherwise based upon a II second opinion", his own positive 
assessment of his condition, or fear. In many cases, the 
choice to admit is the individual's. Mean length of stay, 
alternatively, is pre-determined to a large extent, as many 
procedures have a standard operating and recovery time. 
Moreover, the individual is more likely to accept his 
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physician's ;udgment regarding his prescribed length of 
stay; he is hospitalized, so part of the decision has been 
wade already, and, more importantly, he is more likely to 
accept his physician's recommendation to stay longer , as 
evidenced by his Frior acceptance of his physician's 
judgment regarding admittance. 'On the other hand, 'p:erhaps 
length of stay is more of a choice variable than admission. 
The two opticns of admission and Don-admission are much more 
extreme than, say, the two options of a seven-day st~y and 
an eight~day stay. As a result, individuals probably 
"choose" to be admittEd when they do not need to be as a 
precautionary measure; the alternative of non-admisssion is 
perceived to be much riskier. Furthermore, besides the risk 
perceived by the patient, the risk perceived by his 
physician may lea~ him to insist that his patient be 
. 
admitted. Thus, because the patient is consuming basically 
the same product ~hether be stays one day less or one day 
more, while he does net consume the product at all if he is 
not admitted, perhaps length of stay is a matter about which 
the patient has mere choice. 
Reasons for the inclusion of the other variables are 
more . straightforward. Demand theory stipulates that price 
be included. To control for the effects of general 
in£lation, gross price is deflated by the consumer price 
ind~x. This re.lative price is then multiplied by the 
coinsurance rate so that it measures the effective price to 
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the consumer. Because hospital care is certainly not a 
Giffen good, the coefficient of net price is expected, ! priori, 
to be significan tly negati ve® The proportion of 
population 65 and over is included to control for the effect 
~hich age has upen rate cf hospitalization. Because of the 
deterioration which accom~anie~ age, the coeficient of OAGE 
is expected to be significantly Positive~ncome is 
positively related to demand in traditional theory; in the 
market for hcspital care, however, it~ role is more complex. 
If hosFital care is not aD inferior good Ca very reasonable 
assumption), then demand theory suggests that demand will 
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present with regard to hospital care, there are two other i! V/ 61' 
While this effect is certainly 
e£fects as well. Fi<st. Feople with hiqhe< income qeneraIJ~ v '~J" ". 
/ /JVtlJ have mare education, and may engage in mare preventive 
/ I ~7 ' 
activity as a result. Second, if we assume that all people // 
, I: " 
i I 
I I work the same number of hours per week, then per capita 
income measures the average time-price of hospital care. 
'
1 j 
Accor:dingly, those people with a higher opportunity cost of 
muted, however, due to the fact that the population sampled ! 
time will consume less care. All income effects may be 
is state averages rather than individual values, thus 
eliminating the wide dispersion which is present in a random 
sample of individuals. Because of all this, it is difficult 
to predict the sign or significanc~ of the intome 
coefficient, although it is suspected to be positive and 
significant , as others have found. Tbe availability of 
outpatient facilities and general practitioners both appear 
to have ambiguous effects on demand, as each has qualities 
of both substitutes and complements. Availability, as 
measured by cutpa tient faci Ii ties and general practitioners 
per capita, is used instead of price, because, as Feldstein 
notes, price does not ration these services; persistent - --... ,....."... 
excess demand suggests that availability plays the most 
important role in rationing thsseservices (7). An 
outpatient facility can either complement inpatient care, 
following one's release from the hospital, or serve as a 
sUbstitute for it, as sim~lar procedures can be performed 
without necessitating hospitalization. A visit to a general 
practitioner can result in the prescription of 
hospitalization, and is thus complementary, or may actually 
take the place of hospital care, thus functioning as a 
substitute. Because the SUbstitution effects seem stronqe.I:' 
than the complementary ones, the signs of both coefficients 
ar€ expected to be negative, and because outpatient care is 
a closer substitute for inpatient hospital care than general 
practitioner care, its coefficient viII be more h~ghly 
significant. Hospitalization statistics indicate that women 
are more freguent ly has pi talized than men, even after 
obstetric care is removed from the total. Therefore, the 
coefficient of MALE is expected to be significantly 
negative. A higher propertion of whites is expected to 
J 
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produce a higher demand for hospitalization, due primarily \ 1 
to hiqher emfloyment. and thus. more likely participation in ) ~ 
groups health insurance, and higher education. T~is 
coefficient is expected to be significantly positive. The 
coefficient of PPBV, the proportion of total hospital 
insurance benefits comprised by private insurance hospital 
benefits, is expected to be negatively significant. This is 
primarily because the large maiority of public insurance 
benefits (Medicare benefits) are paid to people with , 
relatively lew cost of time. That is, the elderly are much ji 
less likely tc be employed than are people who are covered 
by private hospital insurance, who are generally younger. 
Because opportunity cost of time is probahly not captured 
too well in the per capita income variable, its effects are 
likely to be manifested in the PPRV' coef.ficient. Another 
possible reason, although certainly less siqnificant, is 
that the emphasis of Medicaid and Medicare coverage is on 
tbe early stages of treatment, whie private insurance often 
offers a deductible which only takes effect after a certain 
level of expenditure has been reached. Thus, a higher 
proportion of public hos~ital insurance benefits is expected 
to increase the rate of admissions. (The full ramifications 
of this hypothesis are discussed in Chapter 7.) The rate of 
death frem cancer (CANC) is a proxy for the rate of 
ocurrence of all cancer (terminal and otherwise), and its 
coefficient is expected to be significantly positive. If 
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the propertion which cancer deaths are of all cancer ca.ses 
is relatively constant across states, then rate of death is 
an acceptable proxy. More generally, this variable is 
intended to measure differences in occurrence of disease 
across states. Because cancer is so prevalent and because 
it reflects environmental, occupational, and behavioral 
differences among states, it is a good proxy for the whole 
vector of diseasEs which distinguish states. Finally, the 
two instruments must be justified. Average real salary of 
full-time hospital personnel is a determinant of the supply 
,~. of .hospital care, and is considered exogenous in its use as 
,+o/t an instrument for two-st~ge least squares. although it is to 
~ . some extent derived from the demand for hospital care. 
Average salary is a proxy for average hourly wage; thus, it 
is assumed that the -average number of annual hours worked by 
hospital employees is the same across states. Hospitals per 
capita is also considered exogenous, as the number of 
hospitals is not very responsive to current 
demand-and-supply condi tions because of barriers to entry, 
both economic and regulatory. High capital costs is an 
example of the former; certificate-of-need-regulations an 
example of the latter. 
After the two versions of the demand equation are 
estimated, several types of tests will be performed. First, 
the value and significance of all coefficients will be . 
examined, and compared with hy~otheses made regarding the 
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coefficisnts. Three coefficients are of particular 
interest--those corresponding to relative net price, income, 
and the ~roportion which private insurance benefits are of 
total benefits. Just how price-elastic is the demand for 
hospital care? Does income have a sigificant effect? If 
so, what is the direction of that effect? What effect does 
an increase in the proFortion of public insurance benefit s 
have? Cf additional interest are the comparative maqnitudes 
and significance of the coefficients in each equation. Does 
one of the t~o specifications generally have smaller and/or 
less significant coefficients? If the coefficients of one 
of the two equations are generally less siqnificant, some 
evidence is Frovided regarding the relative status of the 
dependent variable used in that specification as a choice 
vaciable. If the consumer has absolutely no choice 
regarding the quantity which he consumes of of a good, one 
expects all af the elasticities with respect to that good to 
not .be significantly differe·nt from zero. Thus, if the 
consumeI has relatively less choice about the amount of his 
consumption of a good, as measured in a particular way, one 
expects the coefficients of that equation to be less 
s ignificant than the coefficients of another equation, which 
is defined in terms of a dependent variable about which the 
consn~er has greater choice. Hopefully, the regression 
results will provide some resolution concerning the deqree 
of choice connected with admissions and length of stay. 
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From this conclusion, policy implications will be able to be 
drawn regarding the potential chanqe in consumption by 
either measure which would occur if patient incentives were 
altered. policy implications will also be suggested by the 
price elasticitiEs and the proportion of private insurance 
e lasticities, such as, what would be the efect of an 
increase in the proportion of private insurance benefits 
paid? Also, the income elasticities may imply something 
about the net effect of the many hypothesized income 
effects. pinally, using estimates of net price elasticity 
of demand and the average coinsurance rate, the welfare qain 
of increasing the coinsurance rate will be calculated. The 
validity of this estimat e will then be considered in light 
of Felds tein's definition of welfare loss , and an improved 
definition of welfare loss will be offered. 
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Two-sta'ge least squares reqressions were cond ucted usinq 
admissions rate and mean stay as dependent variables. 
Complete regressicn results are listed in Table 1. I n the 
admissions rate specification five coefficients are 
siqnificant at higher than the 90 percent level, and one 
other coefficient is significant at hiqher than the 80 
percent level. The five coefficients siqnificant at higher 
than 90 percent correspond to the variables relative net 
price (NPBI), real per capita income (INC), proportion of 
males (MALE), proportion of whites (WHIT), and proportion of 
private insurance hospital benefits of total hospital' 
insurance benefit s (PPRV). The net price e lasticity of 
admissions is estimated to be -.604, and its correspondinq 
t-statistic is -2.598, indicating that the coefficient is 
significantly different from zero at approximately the 99 
percent level. The income elasticity of admissions is 
-.393, and its t-statistic is -2.580, indicating 
significance at the 99 percent level. The proportion of 
males coefficient is -2.32 1, and its t-statistic is -2.206 , 
indicating Significance at the 97 percent level. The 
proportion of whites coefficient is .763, and i'ts 
t-statistic is 2.302, indicating siqnificance at close to 
the 98 percent level. Finally, the proportion of private 
insurance coefficient is -~053, and its t-statistic is 
-1.834, indicating significance at the 93 percent level. 
The othe~ fairly significant coefficient is that 
corresponding to the outpatient facilities per capita 
variable. Its value is -.110, and its t-statistic is 
- t.441, indicating significance at the 84 percent level. 
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The coefficients of the variables measuring proportion 
of the population 65 and over, general practitioners per 
capita, and the rate of death from cancer, as well as the 
constant term are insignificant. The constant term is .819 
and its t-statistic is .489. The proportion of the 
population 65 and over coefficient is .035 and its 
t-statistic is .460. The general practitioners per capita 
coefficient is -.121 and its t-statistic is -.790. Finally, 
the rate of death from cancer coefficient is -.217 and its 
t-statistic is -.872. 
In the mEan length of stay specification, all but one of 
the coefficients are signficant at the 80 percent level, and 
all but two are significant at the 90 percent level. The 
constant term is -20.230 and its t-statistic is -1.686, 
indica tin 9 significance a t slightly above the 90 percent 
level. The net J;rice elastici ty of sta y is -4.844, and its 
t-statistic is -2.905,indicating significance at well above 
the 99 percent level. The income elasticity of stay is 
1.690 and its t-statistic is 1.547, indicating significance 
at the 87 percent level. The outpatient facilities per 
capi-ta coeff icient is - 1. 190 and its t-stat istic is - 2. 17 1, 
indicating significance at the 97 pe.ccent level. The 
general practitioners per capita coefficient is -2.561, and 
its t-statistic is -2.334, indicating significance at the 98 
percent level. The propertion of males coefficient is 
-17.411 and its t-statistic is -2.307, indicating ~ 
significance at almost the 98 percent level. The proportion \ 
of whites coefficient is 7. 010, and its t-statistic is J \I 
2.948~ indicating significance at well above the 99 percent 
level. The proportien of private insurance coefficient is 
-.483, and its t-statistic is -2.331, indicating 
significance at the 98 percent level. The rate of death 
from cancer coefficient is -4.416, and its t-statistic is 
-2.479, indicating significance at the 98.5 percent level. 
The only insignificant coefficient is that corresponding to 
the proportion of people 65 and over variable. Its value is 
• 126, and its t-statistic is .229. 
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Close examination and interpretation of the regression 
resu.lts produces some striking and provocative conclusions. 
In general, the elasticities of mean stay are much greater ~ 
than the elasticities of admission, many by a factor of . ~.? , 
j
6"? . ,r'''\ 
eig.ut or more. As already mentioned, the mean :>tay equation . / 
also has more significant ~nd more highly significant 
coefficients than the admissions rate equation. This 
general pattern is probably due to the greater deqree of 
choice associated with length of stay, as opposed to 
admission. Because people have more choice with respect to 
length of stay, they are thus more responsive to the many 
factors which determine their length of stay. Indeed, a 
marginal effect is present with respect to mean stay that is 
not present with respect to admissions. Certainl y, the 
difference between seven and eight days in the hospital is 
much less than that between admission and non-admisssion. 
Many people who would not consider non-admission a viable 
altern'ative would, however, attempt to shorten their length 
of stay in response to the net price or opportunity cost of 
an additional day. The net price elasticity of admissions 
of -.604 is quite consistent with Feldstein's 1971 estimate 
of -.63, although it is much larger in absolQte value than 
Feldstein's 1977 estimates, which rang~ from -.042 to -.236, 
4 9 
depending upon which period of time is sampled {-.236 
applying to 1966-1973). !he net price elasticity of 
admission .found in this research means that the demand for 
admission to the hospital does not respond much to the 
effective price faced. The net price elasticity of stay is 
much larger in absolute value ,however. Its value of -4.844 
indicates relatively high responsiveness to changes in the 
effective price of one day of hospital care. By contrast, 
Feldstein obtains net price elasticities of stay of -.5 in ~ 
his 1971 study and -.08 in his 1977 study. These es~imates 
imply that not only is net price elasticity of stay 
~ inelastic, but it is'lQnerally less elastic than net price 7t elasticity of admission. This st udy, alternatively, 
suggests that the consumer is more responsi ve to t .he price 
he pays in ch60sing (if he can) his length of .stay than in 
c hoosing (if he can) whether to be admitted. 
Also provocative are the income elasticities. The only 
coefficient to change sign in the two regressions (besides 
the constant term), the income elasticity o.f admission is 
-.393 and income elasticity of stay is 1.690. Both values 
are significant, although the --elastici t.I_of admiss~ ~ 
more highly significant. Peldstein's inc ome elasticity of -< .. --
admission is .08 and is s ignificant '. The negative 
elasticity of admission found here can perhaps be ascribed 
. to the two negative income effects described earlier. If 
so, then the effects of hypothesized preventive behavior and 
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higher 0fPortunity cost of time outweiqh 
th e traditional normal good effect. Th e 
income elasticity of stay is somewhat consistent with 
previous estimates, which are in the .~-.6 range, and a r e 
usually significant. The estimated value of 1.690 in this 
study, however, implies that demand for marginal days of 1 / ( 
stay is income elastic. 'Ibis finding i s in conflict with / ' . 
the existing literature, wherein the d e mand for ma.rginalJ 
days i s estimated to be income inelastic. 
The propcrtioD of private insurance benefits coefficient 
is negative in both specifications tested, assuming values 
of -.053 in ~he admissions rate equation and -.483 in the 
mean s tay eguation, and both are significant. Thi s means 
that the greater the propertion of private insurance 
benefits paid in a state, the lower will be the admission s 
rate and the mean length of stay, ce!2ri~ E.~ri12u2. 
Considered another way, these results mean that a given 
amount of putlic hospital insurance benefits has larger 
effect cn both measures of demand than does the same amount 
of private hospital benefits. Feldstein crudely 
a~proximates the effects of Medicaid on demand bV including 
a dummy variable which indicates the presence or absence of 
aedicaid in a given state in a given year. He obtains a 
significant Fositive coefficient when mean stay is the 
dependent variable and a Significant negati ve coefficient 
when admissicns rate is the dependent variable. From thi s , 
5 1 
he concludes tha t ~M edicaid does not increase the adm~ssionS 
rate by as much as an equal amount of private insurance 
\IIould" P,p. J696). This deductio n seems spurious, howev e r, 
since Feldstein does not measure the actual amounts of 
private and public hos~ital insurance benefits paid, as is 
done in this study. 
Surprisingly, the coeficent corresponding to the 
proportion of the population over 65 variable is 
insignificant, although it is positive. Because of the 
tendency of the elderly to have longer hospital stays, one 
would particularly have antipicated a significant aqe effect 
on mean stay. Instead, the age coefficient is insignificant 
in both cases. If this finding i s consistent with reality, 
perhaps it represents availability problems, i.e.~ inability 
to get to the hospi tal, the unwillinqess of t,he elderly to 
seek treatment, or their inability to recognize that t .hey 
are ill. 
The general practitioners per capita coefficient is 
- . 121 and insignificant for the admissions rate 
specification and -2.561 and significant for the mean stay 
specification. ~his difference indicates that general 
practitioners serve as a much better substitute for the 
marginal day in the hospital than for admission to the 
hospital. T hat is, while' general practitioners cannot 
perform most procedures which patients undergo in a 
hospital, agreement to visit onefs genera~ practitioner may 
allow one to be released earlier. Feldstein (7) sho ws 
general practitioners to be a substitute for marginal 
hospital days, although his elasticities are around -.02, 
much smaller in absolute value. He also estimtes that 
~\ 
general pn,aactitioners are a complement to hospital 
" .... _.,)' .. 
admissions, as his GP coefficient is .03. This 
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complementary relationship e.x:istslihen one enters a hospital 
based upon his general practitioner's advice. 
outpatient facilitie s are also estimated to act as a 
substitute fer hospitalization, measured both in terms of 
admissions and length o f stay. The outpatient elasticity of 
admissions is -.110, and is fairly significant (94 percent 
level) while the elasticity of mean stay is -1.190, and i s 
significant (97 percent level). Similar to general 
practitioners, ootpatient facilities are a better sUDstitute 
for marginal days in the hospital than for admissions. In 
addition, outpatient facilities appear to be a better 
substitute for ad~ission than general practitioners, as, in 
the admissions equation, the coefficient of OUTP is 
significant, while the GPS coefficient is not. 
The significant negative value of the proportion of 
males coefficient in both cases is consistent with 
statistical evidence which indica tes that women demand more ,\ 
hospital care than men, even after obstetric care has been \ 
removed. Both elasticities are relatively large (-2.321 fOr ) 
ADMl and -17.411 for MSTY), indicating that a one percent 
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increase in the Froportion of women leads to a 2.321 percent 
increase in admissions and a staggering 17.411 percent 
increase in average length of stay. Whether this sexual 
difference in hospi tal use is ca used by di£ferences in ra tes 
of illness or in rreferences is unknown; this provides an 
interesting guestion for future research, if an accurate 
method of preference measurement can be determined. 
The propertion of whites has a siqificantly positive 
effect en both admissions and mean stay, particularly the 
latter. Indeed, a one percent increase in the proportion of 
whites leads to a 7.010 percent increase in average lenqth 
of stay. This finding is probably most attributable to the 
generally higher level of education attained by whites, and 
the positive relationship between education and consumpti.on 
of heal th care. Tha t is, educa tion em phasi zes the value of 
good health and pcrtrays medical science as beneficial and 
safe. Those with less educ~tion, on the other hand, 
probably tend to reject science and to fear medic~l 
procedures as mysterious and dangerous. 
Finally, the coefficient of the cancer variable is 
surprisingly negative in both specifications. In fact, in 
the mean stay specification the coefficient is -4.416 and is 
significant at almost the 99 percent level. Perhaps cancer 
patients who eventually die have shorter stays because they 
die guickly or because they are released when their 
condi tion' is realized to be hopeless. still, one suspects 
that the relationshi~ between cancer patients and cancer 
deaths is fairly constant across states, thus makinq the 
death'rate a good proxy for the actual rate of cancer. 
Perhaps the rate of death from cancer is highly correlated 
with ene of the other independent variables, causing its 
coefficient to be biased. 
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The results generated by the model of the market for 
hospital care presented in this paper have important 
implications for the structure and magnitude of public as 
well as private hospital insurance programs. One 
application of the results of this research can be made to 
the Beagan Administration's recent proposal to alter the 
benefit emphasis of the Medicare program. At present 
Medicare beneficiaries pay the full price of the first day 
of hospitilization ($304 in 1982) and are then completely 
covered for days two through sixty. After sixty days, 
Medicare recipients are Fartially covered for additional 
days, subject to a constraint of sixty such days per 
lifetime. The Reagan proposal contains a significant shift 
from full short-term coverage to full long-term, 
"catastrophic" coverage. The plan sti pula tes tha t, as 
before, the first day is fully paid by the patient. During 
the subsequent two weeks, however, the patient must pay 8 
percent of the daily charges. Days 16 throu~h 60 have a 5 
percent coinsu.rance rate; thereafter, full coverage is 
provided. Intuitively, this proposal seems likely to ha ve a 
profound cost-reducing effect, as the average stay of 
Medicare patients is 11.5 days, well below the 60 day level 
at which co~e=rage dramatically changes; also, the bulk of 
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hospital stays (97.6 percent) are less than 30 days 
{1q.,p.S). u sing the elasticities estimated in this paper, 
the effects of this policy shift can be evaluated. The 
pres~nt price to the consumer of a fifteen day stay is $304. 
with the Feagan Froposal that price rises to $644. This 113 
percent increase in price,~oupled with an elasticity of 
mean stay of -4.844 implies an impossible result-- a 
~eduction in quantity demanded of 547 percent. There are, 
however, several explanations for this insensible result. 
Certainly, the price increase proposed ~y the Beagan 
Administration is based ufon Feldstein's estimated 
elasticity, ~hich is smaller than one in absolute value. 
Also, it may be inappropriate to apply the estimated 
elasticity of this paper to the Medicare proposal for two 
reasons. First, this elasticity may only hold for a certain 
price range; the demand function may not have constant 
elasticity. Second, the elasticity is calculated for the 
population in general, and the elderly may have an 
elasticity much smaller in absolute value. Indeed, if we 
perceive the elderly to need care more because of their 
deteriorating health, and ~f they tr~nslate that need into a 
rigidity with respect to price changes, then their demand is 
certainly less elastic than that of the general population. 
If we assume, however, that the elasticity presented here is 
applicable and accurate, then the .Beagan Administration's 
suggested price increase is too drastic. If, say, a 30 
percent decrease in quantity demanded is desired, a price 
increase of E percent, a relatively small change, is 
recommended. 
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In connection with the Reagan-Feldstein proposal, it is 
useful to examine the coefficient of PPEV, the proportion of 
private benefits variable, found in this paper. The 
regression results presented in Chapter 4 show that the 
proportion of ' pri va te hosJ:i tal insurance var iable is 
negatively related to both the admissions rate and mean 
length of stay. That is, a state with a higher proportion 
of private hospital insurance benefits paid has lower 
admissions and shorter mean stay than a ' state with a lower 
proportion Of private hospital insurance benefits paid, 
cet~ri.§ ~f1:El!'§ • . This e.ffect is relatively small--the 
elasti~ity of admission is -.053 and the elasticity of stay 
is -.483--but it is significant in both cases. This implies 
that systematic differences exist between the privately 
insured and the publicly insured regarding the level of 
hospital care consumed. Because age is already explicitly 
taken into account, these differences can probably be 
primarily attributed to dif~erences in opportunity cost of 
time between the la1:ge majoI:ity of public insurance 
beneficiaries--Medicare recipients--and private insurance 
beneficiaries. Because most Medicare recipients do not 
work, the price of their time is much less than that of 
private insurance beneficiaries, most of whom are employed. 
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AS a result, Medicar e recipients have a smaller disincentive 
to sta y in the haspi tal than private insurance-holders, and, 
as a result, t e nd to be admitted more frequently and stay 
longer. Also, it is possible that differences in the 
structure of insurance contracts of public and private 
beneficiarie s create differences in incentives regarding 
consumption. Although great variety exists among private 
insurance packages, most tend to offer low deductibles 
(20,p.283). As a result, many of the privately insured must 
pay much of the cost of hospital care up to a speciIied 
level, after which the insurance company provides full, or 
at least partial, coverage. By ccntrast, as previously 
mentioned, Medicare, which compo ses a large proportion of 
public insurance ~ayments, is oriented towards comprehensive 
co verage in the early stages' of hosp! taliza tion, and its 
coverage can expire after a certain number of days. Because 
the vast majority of hos pital stays last thirty days or 
less, Medicare recipients and private insurance-holder~ may 
have differing incentives regarding their admission and 
length of stay. Because the private insurance-holder is 
more likely to be paying for more of his stay than the 
Medicare recipient, it is not surprising that statistical 
testing reveals the Medicare recipient both to be admitted 
more frequently and to stay longer. To counteract these 
differences in incentives, partic~larly the former, a change 
in the !edicare benefit structure i s advocated. The Reagan 
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Admimistraticn proposal takes one approach to th~s problem; 
another might involve a base ccinsurance ra te which rises 
with each additional day of stay through the first thirty 
days, plus an admissions monitoring system which raises the 
level of the tase coinsurance rate and/or charges the 
patient for two full day~ instead of one if he has been 
admitted "too often" within a certain past period of time. 
The first proposal provides strong incentive to shorten 
one's stay if possible; the second deters frequent 
admissions. 
More comFlex analysis of . the effect of coinsurance rate 
c~anges can be done using Feldstein's notion of welfare loss 
(equation 1). For the period studied in this paper, 
1973-1977, the welfare gain from the reduced price and 
quantity distortion of excess insurance can be estimated. 
These welfare gains measure the dollar benefits from lower 
hospital care use and lower hospital care prices When 
hospital insurance is reduced. To be specific, the 
magnitude of welfare loss for 1973-1977, at the averaqe 
coinsurance rate for that period, .356, is calculated. 
Then, estimates of welfare loss for the same period, had 
higher coinsurance rates been in effect, are made. T.he 
difference between the latter value and the former value is 
the welfare gai.n which would have resul ted from an increase 
in the coinsurance rate. In this analysis, the assumption 
is made that the patient perceives no increase in quality of 
6{) 
treatment, and therefore the demand curve does not shift as 
shown in Figure 2. Ihis assumption is made because, first 
of all, in a period of five years, it is unlikely that most 
patients would have noticed a perceptible improvement in 
quality. Second, the inc~ease in price which Feldstein 
asserts to be a signal of higher quality to patients, was 
likely ascribed to inflaticn by patients, as the period 
studied was one of high i~flation. Referring again to 
Equation (~ , Feldstein notes that the parameter J, the 
ratio of gross price with insurance to gross price without 
.. b 
insurance, can be written k, where k is the coinsurance 
rate. Two· different values are used for b: l and.S. The 
latter value, .5, i s a more conservative estimate, as it 
implies a smaller increase in price when insurance is 
~nstituted than the value b=1. Estimat~s of the welfare 
loss at various combinations of k and b as well the 
potential welfare gains from a higher coinsurance rate 
during that l!ericd are listed in Table:L. As can readily be 
observed, increases in the coinsurance rate, get~.£.i§ 
£ar,ibu§, are associated with lower levels of welfare loss. 
If one assigns the largest realistic value, 1, to the price 
change parameter, a gross welfare loss of $153 billion is 
calculated. Also, a potential gross gain of approximately 
$80 billion was possible during 1973-1977, had a higher 
coinsurance rate been in effect. 
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Although the es timated loss of $153 billion 
corresponding to k=.356, b=1 compared with total hospital 
expenditures over the five year period of $237 billion is 
probably exaggerated, reasons exist for this apparent 
overestimation. First, Feldstein I s model provides only an 
approximation, a s its use requires the somewhat arbitrary 
assignment of values to several paramaters. Second, and 
more fundamentally, the definition of welfare loss used here 
is an exclusive cencept which doe s not take into account 
several significant effects. ~wo parti~ularly important 
ommissions from the 'we'lf ara loss model are measurement of 
risk-spreading and measurement of externalities. Although 
Feldstein present s a function to measure the gains or losses 
from different levels of risk-spreading , he does not provide 
explicit means for calculating all of the parameters of the 
function. As a result, the gains from risk-spreading which 
accompany th e losses from price and quantity distortion were 
unable to be measured. Had measurement of risk-spreadinq 
benefits been possible, mere realistic estimates could ha~e 
been presented. A second siqnificant effect of insurance, 
which Feldstein overlooks, is the externalities which are 
generated by higher consumption of hospital care, which is a 
result of higher levels of insurance. Three different 
externality effects may accompany higher consumption of 
hospital care, two of which are positive, one of Which i s 
negative. One of the positive e xternalities is perceived to 
occur if health is considered as a public good. 
62 
While one's 
own health is a private good, the h ealth of others is indeed 
a public good. Because someone else's hepatitis can become 
our own, we have incentives to ensure that others do not 
contract the disease. Thus, the good "absence of hepatitis" 
is a public good, as it fulfills the necessary qualities of 
equality of con s umption for each member of society, zero 
marginal cost, and ncn-excludability, i.e., one person's 
consumption does not limit another's. Because society 
benefits from the absence of hepatitis, a disease which can 
be medically treated, medical insurance which prompts the 
consumption of hepatitis treatment produces benefits which 
offset, to seme extent, the welfare loss which accompanies 
higher levels of insurance-holding. A second po~itive 
e xternality of higher consumption of medical care benefits 
employers. Because of the favorab~e tax treatment Which 
employer-provided health insurance receives, many of the 
privately insured people in the United states are covered by 
employment group plans. Probably the employer's strongest 
moti va tion in offer ing health insurance as part of employee 
compensation, besides de s ire tc compete with firms which 
offer similar plans, is the anticipated higher productivity 
of a healthier workforce. If employees are frequently ill 
they disrupt the production process , and the firm's 
productivity is rEduced •. If the employer feels that 
provision of health insurance will enable ill employees to 
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return to work seoner and to generally exhibit better 
health, then it is in hi s best interest to provide it~ I n 
this s am e s ituation, how e ver, the potential exists for 
negati VE externalities. If increased provision of insurance 
encourages e IIlFloyees to see k trea tllen t more frequently th an 
they need it, they viII tend to miss work more frequently 
than before. Thus, the employer's good intentions may be 
foiled if emFloyees respond differently than he anticipates. 
Because the net effect of these three externalities and 
risk-spreading i s prot~bly positive, estimates made using 
Feldstein's model of welfare loss should be considered as 
maximum values • . Finally, further research done in this area 
should attempt to quantitatively incorporate ill welfare 
effects in calculations of the loss which accompanies the 
possession of excess health insurance. 
The implications discussed above estimate the impact of 
changes in the coinsurance rate and of a ' chanqe in Medicare 
provisions. Another pos sible solution to the problem of 
excessive, rising health expenditures is a fundamental 
change in the nature of private insurance c ontracts. Huch 
bewilderment and, paradoxically, many suggestions for change 
have accompanied the tremendous rise of prices and 
expenditures in the American hospital system. Certainly the 
problem is complex; the intertwining of buyer, seller~ and 
insurer has created a nearly unimaginable distortion of 
ince~tives. Many consumers of hospital care pay so little 
64 
of the bill that their incentives to reduce consumption ara 
small; hospitals and physicians attempt to maximize income, 
so they have no incentive to lower costs; and insurers 
sim~ly a djust premiums upward to cover their ever-burgeoning 
expenses. Thus, the individual consumer ~r his employer, . 
ina sense) and taxpayer tear the escalating costs of public 
U 1\ ~OC"-~ .... 
and priv~te hospital ins urance. ~ j the 
~- ~~'t.~~ 
- - incentive to reduce hospital individual 
e xpenditures. The major problem with the present system is 
that individual costs and ben e fit s are divorced from one 
another. To influence individual incentives regarding th e 
consumption of hospital c are, cost~ and benefits must be 
placed in direct relation. One method for doing this is 
what Viscusi (24) refers to as "merit ratinq"~ Merit rating 
signifies that an individual' s premium be adjusted up or 
down based upon the extent of his claims in the preceding 
period. In Vis~usi's model, if no claims are made, the 
.premium decreases; if claims are made, the premium increases 
relative to the amount of claims made by the individual. 
Viscusi develops a comparative statics model which uses the 
above payment procedure. His results strongly confirm th e 
efficacy of merit rating as a cost reduction device. Using 
a tvo-person, two-state model (claim,no claim) he shows that 
a lower premium fcllowing no claim artd a higher premium 
following a claim each induce less insurance-holding and 
mor&self-protection by both the claimant and the 
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non-claimant. Viscusi's results can analogously be applied 
to the present eXFerience-rating model which dominates the 
private health insurance market. To reiterate, 
experience-rating means that the premium which an individual 
pays is based on the risk associated with the demographic 
{age,sex,rac€,income) group to which the individual 
belongs" and increases in premiums are solely based on the 
expenses of that group, and not on increases in individual 
claims. To test viscusi's model, assume that one firm in 
the private health insurance market, Moral Hazard Insurance, 
Inc. has two clients, Mr. Risk and ~r. Distortion. The 
premium for each is p,dollars. During period one, Mr. Risk 
is hospitali2ed at a cost to Moral Hazard, Inc. of W 
dollars, while Mr. Distortion is not hospitalized. I£ we 
assume that Moral Hazard, Inc. has no administrative costs, 
then premiums must rise by W dollars to cover Mr. Eiskts 
expense. Under the conventional practices of private 
insurers, Mr. Ris~'s expense is shared with the other member 
of his group, ~r. Distortion. As . a result, the new premium 
for each is Flo ;:p. + • 5Vi , as 11r. Risk's expenditure is spread 
equally among the members of his gro~p. Aceording to 
viscusi's model, ~Mt. ij,3k ~ ~r. Distortion will 
purchase more insurance and engage in less self-protection 
~ 
in period tWO' Awith the former behavior causing more 
freguent and more costly hospitalizations and the latter 
behavior creating a higher probability of illness and thus 
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of ho s pitalization . As d result, the distortive effects of 
in s uranCE are per~etuated and increased, giving a 
low-consumption person Like Mr. Distortion an incentive to 
se e k an insurance plan in which premiums paid are directly 
related to individual benefits received. 
Not only do incentives exist for low-consumption private 
insurance holders to seek a merit-rating plan, but they also 
exist for insurance companies. Companies could conceivably 
lO)ler their~resEnt prami ums fer low-consumption clients to 
a price still abcve expected cost, while simultaneously 
raising the premium for high-con s umption clients to a price 
still below Expected co s t so that they could still break 
even. Assuming that all insurance-holders were free to 
break thEir contracts immediately without penalty, and that 
all in s uranc~ comFanies could obtain e vidence of the amount 
of each persen' s Expenditures in the previous period, all 
low-consumption FE~ple would purchase policies with the 
firms using merit-rating and all high-consumption people 
would flEe to firms without merit-rating, which would offer 
a lower price. ,fter this massive adjustment, competition 
would adjust the premiums of all companies such that the y 
were proportional to expected cost, i.e., a merit-rating 
system. To allow .fo£ some risk-spreading, each person would 
have to pay a certain amount (regardless of expected 
consumption) which would be the same for all those covered 
by one plan. Although this risk-spreading portion of the 
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premium would be the same for each person in a given plan in 
a given year, the merit-rating portion of the premium would 
monitor con s umption, as individuals would have to pay k 
percent of their previou s year' s expenditures. Thus the new 
premium formula is: 
(15) Pi = R .. kX:(t-1) 
where P;=the ith person' s premium in time t 
B=the equal risk-spreading portion of everyone's premium 
k=coDstant fraction of benefits paid in time ~-1} 
Xi{t-l) =benefi ts paid on behalf of person i in time (t-l) 
Thus, B still allows ri s k-spreading to occur, but kXi(t- n 
ensures that people- will consider the necessity ~nd 
magnitude of their expenditure s . It is difficult to know 
~hy merit-rating Flans have not been offered by private 




The price which the ccnsumer pays influences his demand 
for hospital use, with price changes exerting a greater 
influence on length of stay than on admissions rate by a 
factor of eight. The elasticity of stay calculated in this 
paper is much higher than previous estimates and is elastic, 
casting some doubt on the estimate presented, although 
reasons can be advan6ed for expecting the elasticity of mean 
stay to exceed the elastic~ty of admissions. In attempting 
to apply this elasticity to a recent government proposal it 
is clear that a markedly different elasticity is used to 
make the government's calculation of demand effects. The 
estimated welfare gains from higher coinsurance rates are 
also calculated. As a result it is shown that an increase 
in the coinsurance rate from .356, the actual value, to .67 
would have produced a gross welfare gain of approximately 
$80 billion during the period 1973-1977. These figures must 
be ~iewed with gualification, however, as the definition of 
welfare loss used does not take risk-spreading and 
externality benet its into acco un t. 
Finally, suggestions are made concerning the nature of 
both public and pri vate insurance contracts. A given amOUD t 
of Medicare has a larger effect on demand than an equal 
amount of private insurance. As a result a new type of 
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Medicare contract i s proposed--one in which incentives to 
reduce admissions and shorten length of s tay are provided. 
wi th respect to private insurance, the institution of a 
s ystem which associates individual insurance benefits and 
premiums--merit-rating-- is proposed as the best way to 
control hospital costs: an appeal to individual incentives. 
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